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Ecinimies if Scaae, Imperfect Cimpettin 
and Internatinaa Trade
Preview
• Types of economies of scale
• Internal economies of scale
– Economies of scale and market structure
– The theory of imperfect competton
– Monopolistc competton and trade
– Dumping
• External economies of scale
– The theory of external economies of scale
– External economies of scale and trade
• Internatonal trade and economic geography
Intriductin
• The models studied so far assumed cinstant returns ti scaae:
– When all inputs to an industry increase at a certain rate, output increases at the 
same rate (if inputs were doubled, output would double as well).
• But there may be increasing returns ti scaae ir ecinimies if scaae:
– When all inputs to an industry increase at a certain rate, output increases at a 
faster rate.
– A larger scale is mire efcient: the unit cost of output falls as a frm or industry 
increases output.
• Mutually benefcial trade can arise as a result of economies of scale, by enlarging the 
size if the market. 
– Internatonal trade permits each country to produce a limited range of goods 
without sacrifcing variety in consumpton (variety gain).
– With trade, a country can take advantage of economies of scale to produce more 
efciently than if it tried to produce everything for itself (efciency gain).
Ecinimies if Scaae and Market Structure
• Economies of scale could mean either that larger frms or a larger industry 
would be more efcient.
• Externaa ecinimies if scaae occur when cost per unit of output depends on the 
size of the industry.
• Internaa ecinimies if scaae occur when the cost per unit of output depends on 
the size of a frr.
• Both external and internal economies of scale are important causes of 
internatonal trade but they have diferent impaicatins for the structure of 
industries: 
– An industry where economies of scale are purely external will typically 
consist of many smaaa frms and be perfectay cimpettve.
– Internal economies of scale result when large frms have a cost advantage 
over small frms, causing the industry to become imperfectay cimpettve. 
Internaa ecinimies if scaae
• When internal economies of scale exist, large frms may be more efcient 
than small frms, and the industry may consist of a minipiay ir a few aarge 
frms.
– Producton may be imperfectly compettve in the sense that excess or 
minipiay prifts are captured by large frms.
– Firms (partally) become price-makers and have a certain degree of 
monopoly power.
– Monopoly power can also stem from policies of priduct diferentatin.
• Integraton causes the beter-performing frms to thrive and expand, while 
the worse-performing frms contract.
• We sketch an additonal source of gain from trade: as producton is 
concentrated toward beter-performing frms, the iveraaa efciency if the 
industry imprives. 
• Beter-performing frms have a greater incentve to engage in the global 
economy. 
Imperfect Cimpettin
• Three important theoretcal frameworks for imperfect competton:
– A minipiay: an industry with only one frm (important theoretcal 
benchmark, but not too relevant for internatonal trade).
– An iaigipiay: an industry with only a few frms, strategically 
interactng in terms of price or quantty.
– Minipiaistc cimpettin: a market with frms producing 
diferentated products.
• Monopolistc competton with symmetric frms
• Monopolistc competton with asymmetric frms (diferent 
marginal costs)
Minipiay: A Brief Review
• Simplifying hypothesis: Linear demand curve: Q = A – BP, with P(Q) = A/B – Q/B its 
inverse demand.
• Total revenue is R(Q) = P(Q) Q.
• Marginaa revenue: MR = R’(Q) = P(Q) + Q P’(Q)
• Suppose that titaa cists are C = F + cQ, where F is fxed costs and c is the constant 
marginal cost.
• Average cist is total cost (C) divided by the quantty of producton (Q): AC = C/Q = F/Q 
+ c 
• Marginaa cist is the cost of producing an additonal unit of output: MC = c
– A larger frm is more efcient because average cost decreases as output Q 
increases: internaa ecinimies if scaae.
• The proft-maximizing output occurs where marginaa revenue equaas marginaa cist.
• At the intersecton of the MC and MR curves, the revenue gained from selling an extra 
unit equals the cost of producing that unit.
• The monopolist earns minipiay prifts, indicated by the shaded box, if sets P > AC.
The Minipiay equiaibrium
Minipiaistc Cimpettin
• Minipiaistc cimpettin is a model for an imperfectly compettve 
industry that assumes that each frm:
– can diferentate its product from the product of compettors, and
– takes the prices charged by its rivals as given.
• A frm in a monopolistcally compettve industry is expected to sell:
– mire as total sales in the industry increase and as prices charged by 
rivals increase.
– aess as the number of frms in the industry increases and as the frm’s 
price increases.
• These concepts are represented by the frm demand functon:
Firm demand curve in minipiaistc cimpettin
– Q is an individual frm’s sales
– S is the total sales of the industry (for simplicity take S as given, independent of prices)
– n is the number of frms in the industry
– b is a positve constant term representng the responsiveness of a frm’s sales to its 
price
– P is the price charged by the frm itself and P* is the average price charged by its 
compettors
• Microfoundaton: consumers with diferent preferences and frms producing varietes 
tailored to diferent market segments, as in Salop (1979), yield this demand curve.
• Inverse demand: P(Q) = P* + 1/(bn) – Q/(Sb)
• Revenues: R = P(Q) Q
• Marginal Revenues: MR = P(Q) + P’(Q) Q = P* + 1/(bn) – 2Q/(Sb)     
Q = S[(1 / n)- b(P -P)]
Symmetric Firms: n and AC
• Assume that frms are symmetric: same demand and cost functon, P(Q) 
and C(Q).
– Thus all frms should charge the same price and have equal share of 
the market  
Q = S/n
– Average costs should depend on the size of the market and the 
number of frms: 
AC = C/Q = F/Q + c = n F/S + c
• As the number of frms n in the industry increases, the average cost 
increases for each frm because each produces less.
• As total sales S of the industry increase, the average cost decreases for 
each frm because each produces more.
Minipiaistc Cimpettin: n and prices
• Demand functon can be writen as 
• So P(Q) = ( A – Q ) / B;  R(Q) = P(Q) Q;  MR(Q) = P(Q) – Q P’(Q)   
• Proft maximizaton yields marginal revenue equal marginal cost: 
MR = P – Q/B = MC = c
• With identcal frms, Q = S/n, so the price that each frm charges decreases 
in n because of increased competton:
P = c + Q/B = c + 1/(bn)
Q = S[(1/ n)- b(P -P)]= A-BP
where A = S / n+ SbP and B = Sb
Minipiaistc Cimpettin: equiaibrium n
• Given the number of frms, the price that frms charge (which decreases in 
n) matches the average cost that frms pay (which increases in n).
– At this long-run equilibrium number of frms in the industry, frms 
have no incentve to enter or exit the industry.
– In equilibrium, frms’ profts are zero (or close to zero).
• If the number of frms is greater than or less than the equilibrium number, 
then frms have an incentve to exit or enter the industry.
– Firms have an incentve to exit the industry when price < average cost.
– Firms have an incentve to enter the industry when price > average 
cost.
Equiaibrium in a Minipiaistcaaay 
Cimpettve Market
CC: AC = n(F/S) + c
PP: P = c + 1/(bn)
Minipiaistc Cimpettin and Trade
• Because trade increases market size, trade is predicted to decrease average cost 
in an industry described by monopolistc competton.
– Industry sales S increase with trade leading to decreased average cists: AC = 
n(F/S) + c
• Because trade increases the variety of goods n that consumers can buy under 
monopolistc competton, it increases cinsumers’ weafare:
– due to consumers’ aive fir variety,
– and because average costs decrease, and si di prices.
• As a result of trade, the number of frms in a new internatonal industry is 
predicted to increase relatve to each natonal market (but decrease overall…)
• But it is unclear if frms will aicate in the domestc country or foreign countries.
• Integratng markets through internatonal trade has the same efects as growth 
of a market within a single country.
Minipiaistc cimpettin and trade (2)
CC1: AC = n(F/S1) + c
CC2: AC = n(F/S2) + c
S2 > S1
PP: P = c + 1/(bn)
A numericaa exampae: 
equiaibrium in the autimibiae market
A numericaa exampae: 
equiaibrium in the autimibiae market (2)
A numericaa exampae: 
equiaibrium in the autimibiae market (3)
Intra-industry Trade
• Product diferentaton and internal economies of scale lead to trade between similar 
countries with ni cimparatve advantage diferences between them. 
• Diferent from trade based on comparatve advantage, where each country exports 
its comparatve advantage good.
• It is Intra-industry trade: two-way exchanges of similar goods.
• Two new channels for welfare benefts from trade:
– greater variety and aiwer price. (due to economies of scale).
• A smaller country gains more from integraton than a larger country.
– Trade leads to a larger increase in market size for a smaller country
• About 25–50% of world trade is intra-industry (depending on the coarseness of industry 
classifcaton).
• Most trade of manufactured goods among advanced industrial natons (which accounts 
for the majority of world trade) is intra-industry (North-North trade).
– Such industries are probably subject to important economies of scale in producton.
• “Nirth-Siuth” trade is much less intra-industry.
Indexes if Intra-Industry Trade 
fir U.S. Industries, 2009
Asymmetric Firms: Firm Respinses ti Trade
• Now consider asymmetric frms.
– Assume they face the same demand functon, but difer in MC.
– Increased competton tends to hurt the worst-performing frms: they 
are forced to exit. 
– The best-performing frms take the greatest advantage of new sales 
opportunites and expand the most.
• When the beter-performing frms expand and the worse-performing ones 
contract or exit, iveraaa industry perfirmance imprives. 
– Trade and economic integraton improve industry performance as 
much as the discovery of a beter technology does.
Trade Cists and Expirt Decisiins
• Most frms do not report any exportng actvity at all: they sell only to domestc 
customers.
– In 2002, only 18% of U.S. manufacturing frms reported any sales abroad.
– Even in industries that export much of what they produce, such as chemicals, 
machinery, electronics, and transportaton, less than 40% of frms export.
• Trade cists reduce the number of frms selling to customers across the border. 
– Trade costs also reduce the volume of export sales of frms selling abroad.
• With trade costs: 
– Only a subset of products can be traded (important diference between tradeabae 
and nin-tradeabae giids)
– Only a subset of frms in the tradeable market actually export;
– Exporters are relatvely aarger and mire efcient (lower MC). 
– Overwhelming empirical support for this predicton that exportng frms are bigger 
and more productve than frms in the same industry that do not export. 
– In the U.S., in a typical manufacturing industry, an exportng frm is on average 
more than twice as large as a frm that does not export.
Dumping
• Dumping is the practce of charging a lower price for exported goods than 
for goods sold domestcally.
• Dumping is an example of price discriminatin: and can be analyzed 
borrowing from that theory
• Price discriminaton is the practce of charging diferent customers 
diferent prices.
• Price discriminaton and dumping may occur only if
– irperfect corpetton exists: frms are able to infuence market prices 
by setng their optmal prices.
– rarkets are segrented so that goods are not easily bought in one 
market and resold in another.
– The optmal strategy is to set a lower price in the market which has the 
higher elastcity of demand (it is most responsive to price)
Pritectinism and Dumping
• Dumping can be “unfair”, e.g. if driven by state subsidies.
• But dumping can be a proft-maximizing strategy:
– A frm with a higher MC sets a lower markup.
– Exportng frms respond to trade costs by lowering their markup for the export market.
• This strategy is considered to be dumping, regarded by most countries as an “unfair” trade 
practce.
• Economists ofen critcize ant-dumping rules as disguised protectonism.
• Since the ‘70s U.S. frms increasingly obtained protecton from Chinese “unfair” competton
– Through “ant-dumping dutes” equal to the diference between the actual and “fair” 
price of imports (where “fair” means the “price the product is normally sold at in the 
manufacturer's domestc market.”)
– As China was considered a non-market economy, the U.S. ofen ignored its cost data and 
based “fair” prices on costs in India,which were much higher than in China...
– Hence, China “unfairly” sold at prices lower than Indian costs!
– Dutes were as high as 78% of the price on color TVss and 330% on saccharin.
Externaa Ecinimies
External economies imply that the larger the industry, the lower the industry’s costs.
External economies may exist for a few reasons:
1) Speciaaized equipment ir services may be needed for the industry, but are only 
supplied by other frms if the industry is large and concentrated.
2) Labir piiaing: a large and concentrated industry may atract a pool of workers, 
reducing employee search and hiring costs for each frm.
3) Kniwaedge spiaaivers: workers from diferent frms may more easily share ideas that 
beneft each frm when a large and concentrated industry exists. .
• Aafred Marshaaa frst analyzed industrial districts in his 1890 Principles of Economics
• Many modern examples of industries that seem to have powerful external 
economies: 
– In the United States, the sofware and hardware industry is concentrated in 
Silicon Vsalley, investment banking in New York, and the entertainment industry 
in Hollywood. 
The Theiry if Externaa Ecinimies
• With external economies, there is a firward-faaaing suppay curve: the 
larger the industry’s output, the lower the price at which frms are 
willing to sell.
• Without internatonal trade, the unusual slope of the supply curve 
doesn’t mater much.
• Prior to internatonal trade, equilibrium prices and output for each 
country would be at the point where the domestc supply curve 
intersects the domestc demand curve. 
Externaa Ecinimies Befire Trade
Externaa Ecinimies and Internatinaa Trade
• What happens if the countries ipen up ti trade?
• The Foreign industry expands (due to external economies), while the U.S. 
industry contracts. 
– This process feeds in itseaf: As the Foreign industry’s output rises, its 
costs will fall further; as the Home industry’s output falls, its costs will 
rise.
– In the end, all producton will be concentrated in Foreign.
• How does this concentraton of producton afect prices?
– Foreign prices were lower than Home prices before trade.
– Because Foreign’s supply curve is forward-falling, increased producton 
as a result of trade aeads ti a aiwer price.
– Trade leads to prices that are lower than the prices in either country 
before trade
Trade and Prices
Externaa Ecinimies and Internatinaa Trade
• Vsery diferent from the implicatons of models without increasing returns.
• In the standard trade model relatve prices cinverge as a result of trade. 
– If cloth is relatvely cheap in Home and relatvely expensive in Foreign before 
trade, trade raises cloth prices in Home and reduces them in Foreign.
• With externaa ecinimies, by cintrast, the efect if trade is ti reduce prices 
everywhere.
• What might cause one country to have an inital advantage from having a lower 
price?
– One possibility is cimparatve advantage due to underlying diferences in 
technology and resources.
– If external economies exist, however, the patern of trade could be due to 
histiricaa accidents.
– Countries that start as large producers in certain industries tend to remain large 
producers even if another country could potentally produce more cheaply.
Externaa Ecinimies and Internatinaa Trade (2)
• Trade based on external economies might have an ambiguous effect on national welfare.
– There will be gains to the world economy by concentrating production of industries 
with external economies.
– It is possible that a country is worse off with trade than it would have been without 
trade.
• Imagine that Thailand could make watches more cheaply, but Switzerland got there first.
– Watch prices could be lower in Thailand with no trade. 
– Trade could make Thailand worse off, creating an incentive to protect its potential 
watch industry from foreign competition.
– Thailand cannot enter the market because as a start-up, own AC is higher than P.
• Note that it’s still to the benefit of the world economy to take advantage of the gains from 
concentrating industries.
• Each country wanting to reap the benefits of housing an industry with economies of scale 
creates trade conflicts.
• Overall, it’s better for the world that each industry with external economies be 
concentrated somewhere.
Externaa Ecinimies and Internatinaa Trade (3)
Dynamic Increasing Returns
• So far, we have considered cases where external economies depend on the amount of 
current output at a point in tme.
• But external economies may also depend on the amount of curulatie output oier tre.
– Existence of a aearning curve
• Dynamic increasing returns ti scaae exist if average costs fall as cumulatve output over 
tme rises.
– Dynamic increasing returns to scale imply dynamic external economies of scale.
– The theoretcal analysis and implicatons are the same as before.
• Like external economies of scale at a point in tme, dynamic increasing returns to scale 
can aick-in an inital advantage or a head start in an industry.
– They can be used to justfy protectonism: Temporary protecton of industries enables 
them to gain experience: infant industry argument (but temporary is ofen for a long 
tme, and it is hard to identfy when external economies of scale really exist).
Internatinaa Trade and Ecinimic Geigraphy
• External economies may also be important for interregiinaa trade within a country.
– Many speciaaized ecinimic districts exist in almost every country
– Some non-tradeable goods like veterinary services must usually be supplied 
locally.
• If external economies exist, the patern of trade may be due to historical accidents:
– Regions that start as large producers in certain industries tend to remain large 
producers even if another region could potentally produce more cheaply
• Ecinimic geigraphy refers to the study of internatonal trade, interregional trade 
and the organizaton of economic actvity in metropolitan and rural areas.
• Communicaton changes such as the Internet, e-mail, video conferencing, mobile 
phones (as well as modern transportaton) are changing how humans transact with 
each other across space..
Summary
● Trade does not need to be the result of comparatve advantage. Instead, it 
can result from increasing returns ir ecinimies if scaae, that is, from a 
tendency of unit costs to be lower with larger output.
● Economies of scale give countries an incentve ti speciaaize and trade even 
in the absence of diferences in resources or technology between countries.
● Economies of scale can be internaa (depending on the size of the frm) or 
externaa (depending on the size of the industry).
● Economies of scale can lead to imperfectly compettve markets 
(monopolies, monopolistc competton)
● In general, trade when there are internal economies of scale increases 
welfare by leading the price to fall below the price before trade and by 
increasing the variety of available products.
Summary (2)
● External economies give an important role to histiry and accident in 
determining the patern of internatonal trade. 
● When external economies are important, a country startng with a large 
advantage may retain that advantage even if another country could 
potentally produce the same goods more cheaply.
● When external economies are important, countries can conceivably aise frim 
trade.
● Trade based on external economies of scale may increase or decrease 
natonal welfare, and countries may beneft from temporary protectonism if 
their industries exhibit external economies of scale either at a point in tme 
or over tme. 
● Ecinimic geigraphy refers to how humans transact with each other across 
space, including through internatonal trade and interregional trade.
